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THE FUTURE OF THE CHINESE WALL DEFENSE
TO VICARIOUS DISQUALIFICATION OF A
FORMER GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY'S LAW FIRM*
A former government attorney in private practice must disqualify
himself from participating in a matter1 in which he had substantial
responsibility2 while a public employee.' Often, a former government at-
* After this article went to press, the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit's
decision in Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacating en banc 606 F.2d 28
(2d Cir. 1979), affg on rehearing 461 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), citing the Supreme
Court's recent opinion in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 49 U.S.L.W. 4089 (Jan. 13,
1981). 49 U.S.L.W. 3514 (Jan. 20, 1981). Armstrong is the principal case discussed in this
article. In Armstrong, the Second Circuit prospectively held that orders denying disqualifi-
cation motions are not appealable immediately as a matter of right. 625 F.2d at 435; see text
accompanying notes 39-53, 78-106 infra. The Second Circuit also implicitly approved the ef-
ficacy of screening to prevent the vicarious disqualification of a former government at-
torney's law firm in cases in which that attorney had substantial responsibility for a related
matter while a public employee. See text accompanying note 119-20 infra. In Firestone, the
Supreme Court held that orders denying a motion to disqualify counsel are not appealable
immediately as a matter of right. 49 U.S.L.W. 4089, 4092 (Jan. 13, 1981). In vacating the
Eight Circuit's decision in Firestone, the Supreme Court noted that the Eight Circuit was
without jurisdiction to hear the appeal and, thus, improperly reached the merits of the case.
Id.
In Armstrong, the Second Circuit chose to reach the merits because failure to reach the
merits would leave the law of the Second Circuit on attorney disqualification muddled. 625
F.2d at 441; see note 60 infra. The Supreme Court apparently vacated Armstrong because
the Second Circuit was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal as the Eight Circuit was
without jurisdiction to hear the appeal in Firestone. The Second Circuit's decision in Arm-
strong, therefore, should stand as an advisory opinion detailing the Second Circuit's position
on the propriety of using screening to prevent the vicarious disqualification of a former
government attorney's law firm. See text accompanying notes 61-77, 107-21 infra.
The reader also should note the discussion of the prerequisites for exceptions to the
final judgement rule under Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). See text ac-
companying notes 43, 95-99 infra. Some commentators suggest that four Cohen prere-
quisites exist. See text accompanying note 97 infra. The Firestone Court, however, failed to
state a fourth Cohen prerequisite. See 49 U.S.L.W. 4089, 4091 (Jan. 13, 1981) (stating three
parts of Cohen "collateral order" test). See also text accompanying note 96 infra.
I The ABA suggests that the term "matter" means "a discrete or isolatable transac-
tion or set of transactions between identifiable [sic] parties." ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, RECENT ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 342 (1975), reprinted in 62
A.B.A.J. 517, 519 (1976) [hereinafter cited as OPINION 342 and cited to 62 A.B.A.J.]. The
same lawsuit is the same matter. The same issue of fact involving the same parties and the
same situation is the same matter. Id.; see Note, Business as Usual- The Former Govern-
ment Attorney and ABA Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D), 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1537, 1564-65 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Business as Usual] (interpreting definition of "matter" and suggesting
that "matter" not be construed narrowly).
' The ABA defines "substantial responsibility" as a "responsibility requiring the of-
ficial to become personally involved to an important, material degree in the investigative or
deliberative processes regarding the transactions or facts in question." OPINION 342, supra
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torney's law firm receives requests to act as counsel in matters in which
the attorney may not participate. As an attempt to prevent vicarious
disqualification" of the entire law firm, the firm may build a Chinese
Wall5 around the former government attorney." The Chinese Wall
screens the former government attorney from direct and indirect par-
ticipation in the matter.7 The effectiveness of the Chinese Wall's screen-
ing of a former government attorney and the appropriateness of the
Chinese Wall's use to prevent vicarious disqualification are the subject
of a continuing debate.8 In Armstrong v. McAlpin,9 the Second Circuit
entered this debate. The court also addressed the collateral issue
note 1, at 519. Thus, the chief official in a large government office does not have "substantial
responsibility" in all matters handled by that office. Id.; see Business as Usual, supra note 1,
at 1565-66 (suggesting that ABA's definition of substantial responsibility requires that
degree of knowledge imputed to supervisory official from those working under him be con-
strued narrowly).
See text accompanying note 11 infra; note 13 infra.
Vicarious disqualification refers to the imputing of an attorney's disqualification to
his law firm. See text accompanying note 12 infra (ABA rule requiring vicarious disqualifi-
cation).
' An organization constructs a Chinese Wall to control conflict of interest problems.
Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398, 402 (2d Cir. 1974); see Harzel & Colling,
The Chinese Wall and Conflict of Interest in Banks, 34 Bus. LAW. 73, 74, 75 n.2 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Herzel & Coiling]. Investment banking departments of securities firms
and banks are major users of Chinese Wall procedures. The wall prevents inside informa-
tion concerning a customer from flowing to the securities firm's sales department or to the
bank's trust department. See generally Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398 (2d
Cir. 1974); Herzel & Colling, supra; Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Con-
flict Problems of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U.L. REV. 459 (1975). The terms "screening" and
"Chinese Wall" are synonymous. Screening requires that the law firm exclude the dis-
qualified attorney from any discussion, contact, or participation in the matter in which he
had substantial responsibility while a public employee. Additionally, the law firm must pre-
vent the attorney from sharing in the remuneration attributable to the matter. See OPINION
342, supra note 1, at 521; Business as Usual, supra note 1, at 1540 n.11 (defining screening).
' For cases concerning law firms' use of Chinese Walls in an attempt to avoid
vicarious disqualification see Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 436-37, 442-46 (2d Cir.
1980), vacating en banc 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), affg on rehearing 461 F. Supp. 622
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Central Milk Producers Co-Op. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988,
990 (8th Cir. 1978); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 792-93 (Ct. Cl. 1977). See
generally Comment, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 677 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Chinese Wall Defense].
See note 5 supra (detailing requirements for screening).
See generally G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW, 111-13 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as HAZARD]; Cutler, New Rule Goes Too Far, 63 A.B.A.J. 727 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as New Rule]; Note, The Former Government Attorney and the Code of Professional
Responsibility: Insulation or Disqualification?, 26 CATH. U.L. REv. 402 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Insulation or Disqualification]; Note, Ethical Problems for the Law Firm of a
Former Government Attorney: Firm or Individual Disqualification, 1977 DUKE L.J. 512
[hereinafter cited as Ethical Problems].
625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacating en banc 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), affg on
rehearing 461 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). All future cites to the Armstrong en banc deci-
sion will be 625 F.2d (en banc). The vacated panel decision will be cited as 606 F.2d (panel).
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whether the denial of a disqualification motion should be appealable im-
mediately as a matter of right.10
The American Bar Association (ABA) Code of Professional Respon-
sibility's Disciplinary Rule (DR) 9-101(B) forbids a former government at-
torney from accepting private employment in a matter in which he had
substantial responsibility while a public employee." DR 5-105(D) forbids
a partner or associate of a lawyer who must decline employment under a
disciplinary rule from accepting or continuing such employment. " When
DR 5-105(D) is read in conjunction with DR 9-101(B), a former govern-
ment attorney's disqualification apparently extends to his law firm."3
The ABA, however, did not consider the effect DR 5-105(D) would have
on a former government attorney entering private practice when the
ABA amended the Disciplinary Rule in 1974." Consequently, the ABA
issued Formal Opinion 342 in an attempt to restrict the blanket dis-
qualification rule of DR 5-105(D) and to clarify the relationship between
DR 9-101(B) and DR 5-105(D)."
In Opinion 342, the ABA Ethics Committee stated that DR 5-105(D)
extended disqualification of a lawyer to his law firm to prevent the
lawyer from circumventing the disciplinary rules. 6 The committee
' 625 F.2d at 434-35, 437-41 (en banc).
" ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 9-101(B) (1979); see note 2 supra (de-
fining "substantial responsibility"); note 1 supra (defining "matter").
" ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-105(D) (1979).
E.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d at 30-31 (panel) (vicarious disqualification re-
quired); Moskowitz, Can D.C. Lawyers Cut the Ties that Bind?, JURIS DOCTOR, Sept. 1976,
at 34 [hereinafter cited as Moskowitz]. The federal conflicts of interest statute, 18 U.S.C. §
207 (Supp. H 1978), permanently bars an attorney from acting on matters in which he was
personally and substantially involved at any time while employed by the government. Id §
207(a). The statute also forbids the attorney from becoming involved in any matter that was
under his official responsibility during his final year of service with a particular department
or agency for two years after leaving the government. Id. § 207(b). The federal statute does
not address the issue of whether the former government attorney's law firm also must dis-
qualify itself because of the attorney's disqualification. See note 25 infra. The statute only
refers to partners of attorneys currently employed by the government. These partners can-
not participate, except as an agent for the government, in any matter in which the govern-
ment attorney "participates or has participated personally and substantially" during his
government service. 18 U.S.C. § 207(g) (Supp. II 1978).
" See Moskowitz, supra note 13, at 34 (effect of DR 5-105(D)). Prior to the 1974 amend-
ment, DR 5-105(D) required that an attorney's disqualification extend to his firm only when
the attorney declined employment pursuant to DR 5-105. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY, DR 5-105(D) (1972). The ABA amended DR 5-105(D) in an attempt to codify
case law and prior ABA opinions.
The ABA probably did not intend to require disqualification of a law firm every time a
disciplinary rule requires that a member of the firm disqualify himself. For example, DR
2-110B3) requires a lawyer to withdraw from employment if his "mental or physical condi-
tion renders it unreasonably difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively,"
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-110(B)(3) (1979). See Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 606 F.2d at 30 n.2 (panel) (discussing DR 2-110B)(3)).
's See OPINION 342, supra note 1, at 517-21.
II Id at 520.
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believed, however, that it must weigh the simplicity of DR 5-105(D)'s
automatic disqualification of a former government attorney's law firm
against policy considerations involving government employment. 7 The
committee concluded that if the law firm, with the approval of the
government agency that employed the disqualified attorney, screens the
attorney from direct or indirect participation in the matter, the law firm
will not violate DR 5-105(D) by accepting or continuing the representa-
tion.18 The Ethics Committee reasoned that screening maintains the im-
portant policy objective that a special disciplinary rule relating only to
former government attorneys should not broadly limit the attorney's
employment after leaving government service.19 The committee feared
that if DR 5-105(D) always imputes the former government attorney's
disqualification to his firm, law firms might not hire government at-
torneys. Consequently, lawyers would shun government service, and the
government would have difficulty recruiting competent attorneys. ° Fur-
thermore, the committee reasoned that screening preserves the major
policy considerations supporting DR 9-101(B)."' One of these considera-
tions is that a lawyer should not accept employment that requires him to
advocate a position adverse to one that he formerly advocated for the
government. 2 Disqualification of the attorney also safeguards confiden-
tial government information from future use by the attorney. More-
over, DR 9-101(B) discourages government attorneys from handling par-
ticular assignments in order to enhance prospects for employment after
leaving the government. 4 Since screening prevents the disqualified at-
torney from participating in or receiving financal benefit from the firm's
handling of the matter, the committee concluded that screening would
preclude the attorney from circumventing DR 9-101(B)."5
" See id. at 520-21.
"S Id. at 521; see note 5 supra (requirements for screening).
" OPINION 342, supra note 1, at 518, 521.
'o Id. at 518. If a disqualification rule is too harsh, the rule becomes a tool enabling a
litigant to improve his prospects by depriving his opponent of competent counsel. Id.; see
Board of Ed. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979) (motion to disqualify used for tac-
tical purposes). Also, the New York City Bar noted that the bar has an obligation to ensure
the availability to the general public of skilled legal counsel equipped with expertise in
necessary areas. Opinion No. 889, 31 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 552, 566 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as N.Y Opinion 889]. See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-1 (1979)
(public's need for legal services met only if able to obtain acceptable legal counsel).
2 OPINION 342, supra note 1, at 518, 521. The Ethics Committee did not consider the
appearance of impropriety as the most important policy consideration underlying DR




SId at 521. Congress arguably intended that the legal profession should govern ques-
tions of imputing disqualification and implicitly approved Opinion 342. Congress specifically
excluded a provision for imputing disqualification from the federal conflicts of interest
statute. See note 13 supra. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary considered that the
issue was within the field of legal ethics and that the Canon of Ethics gave adequate
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Prior to Armstrong v. McAlpin, the Second Circuit had not con-
sidered whether the scireening procedures of Opinion 342 would prevent
the vicarious disqualification of a former government attorney's law
firm." The controversy in Armstrong arose from a Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) investigation of defendants Clovis McAlpin
and Capital Growth Fund (Capital).' Theodore Altman, an Assistant
Director of the SEC's division of Enforcement, supervised the investiga-
tion.' While Altman was with the SEC, the SEC obtained injunctive
relief against the defendants for securities law violations, and the court
appointed Michael Armstrong receiver for Capital.'
In 1975, Altman left the SEC and joined the firm of Gordon, Hurwitz,
Butowsky, Baker, Weitzen & Shalov (Gordon, Hurwitz) in New York
coverage. See S. REP. No. 2213,87th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3552, 3862. For these reasons, the exclusion of an imputation provision in-
dicates a congressional intent to allow the legal profession to govern the imputation issue.
Although the Code of Professional Responsibility and Opinion 342 have superseded the
Canon of Ethics, Congress revised the federal conflicts of interest statute in 1978. See 18
U.S.C. § 207 (Supp. II 1978). Congress did not change the substance of any statutory
reference to partners or associates of government employees. See S. REP. No. 170, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 155, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4216, 4371. Therefore,
Congress still must intend the legal profession to govern questions of imputing disqualifica-
tion and must have approved Opinion 342 implicitly. See generally N.Y. Opinion 889, supra
note 20, at 569-70; Brief of SEC, amicus curiae, on rehearing en banc at 4 n.3, Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) [hereinafter cited as SEC brief].
" Prior to the Armstrong decision, only two courts had addressed an issue similar to
Armstrong. See Central Milk Producers Co-Op. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988
(8th Cir. 1978); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977). Kesselhaut involved
a former general counsel for the Federal Housing Authority. 555 F.2d at 792. While
Kesselhaut is distinguishable from Armstrong because the attorney in Kesselhaut only had
sporadic personal contacts with the matter, see id., the Court of Claims, sitting en banc,
voiced strong approval of Opinion 342. Id. at 793. The Court of Claims stated that dis-
qualification of a law firm is too harsh when the law firm has implemented proper screening
procedures and when truly unethical conduct has not occurred. Id
Central Milk, however, provides no support for either side of the disqualification ques-
tion because of the unique factual setting of the case. The court refused to disqualify the
firm in question, since the opposing party approved the screening procedure two years
before moving to disqualify the firm. 573 F.2d at 992-93.
625 F.2d at 435 (en banc).
Id. at 436. The Armstrong court stated that Altman was not involved in the SEC's
litigation against the defendants on a day-to-day basis, although Altman generally was
aware of the facts and status of the case. The SEC's New York Office prepared and filed the
SEC's complaint and handled the litigation against the defendants. Id The Armstrong
panel, however, depicted Altman's involvement as direct and personal. 606 F.2d at 34
(panel). The trial court suggested that Altman acted only in a supervisory capacity in the
SEC investigation against the defendants and that the investigation did not involve Altman
on a day-to-day basis. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 461 F. Supp. 622, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd on
rehearing, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc).
' 625 F.2d at 435 (en banc). A New York District Court awarded the SEC injunctive
relief against the defendants for violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1979). SEC v. Capital Growth Company, S.A. (Costa Rica), 391 F. Supp. 593, 598 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
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City."0 Five months after Altman joined Gordon, Hurwitz, Armstrong ap-
proached a partner of Gordon, Hurwitz and requested that the firm act
as litigation counsel. The partner promptly advised Armstrong of the
potential conflict problems arising out of Altman's prior role at the SEC.
Despite this potential conflict, Armstrong and Gordon, Hurwitz concluded
that the firm could represent Armstrong if the firm properly screened
Altman according to the procedures of Opinion 342. 81 Twenty-one months
after Armstrong initiated his suit against the defendants, the defend-
ants moved to disqualify Gordon, Hurwitz because of Altman's prior
SEC activity."2 The district court denied the defendants' motion, and the
defendants appealed."
A three-judge panel of the Second Circuit reversed the district court
and ruled that Gordon, Hurwitz must disqualify itself because of
Altman's prior employment with the SEC.' The panel distinguished the
disqualification of a former government attorney resulting from the at-
torney's active, personal participation in a matter from disqualification
resulting from the attorney's nominal involvement as a supervisory of-
ficial. 5 The panel held that screening procedures, however faithfully
625 F.2d at 436 (en banc).
" Id at 435-36; 606 F.2d at 29 (panel). Gordon, Hurwitz never disputed Altman's dis-
qualification. When approached by Armstrong, Gordon, Hurwitz concluded that Altman
should not participate in the firm's representation of the receiver. 625 F.2d at 436 (en banc).
The firm screened Altman from the case by excluding him from participation in the action,
by denying him access to relevant files, and by not allowing him to share in the funds that
the firm would obtain from prosecuting the action. In addition, no one at the firm could
discuss the matter in Altman's presence or permit him to view any document related to the
action. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 461 F. Supp. 622, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (discussing screen-
ing of Altman).
625 F.2d at 436-37 (en banc). Armstrong applied to District Judge Stewart, who had
jurisdiction over the conduct of the plaintiff as receiver for Capital, for approval of Gordon,
Hurwitz' retention. The receiver informed Judge Stewart of Altman's prior activities at the
SEC and that the firm would screen Altman from the action. Judge Stewart approved the
appointment of Gordon, Hurwitz four months before the plaintiff initiated his suit. See id. at
436; SEC Brief, supra note 25, at 8. Judge Stewart, however, did not preside on the defen-
dant's motion to disqualify Gordon, Hurwitz. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 461 F. Supp. 622
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Judge Werker presiding on defendants' motion to disqualify Gordon, Hur-
witz). Further, the receiver informed the SEC of the retention of Gordon, Hurwitz. The
SEC advised Armstrong in writing that the Commission did not object to the retention of
Gordon, Hurwitz so long as the firm screened Altman from participation in the matter. 625
F.2d at 436 (en banc).
The Armstrong trial judge found that the defendants had suffered no prejudice as a
result of Gordon, Hurwitz' representation of the receiver and that this representation did
not threaten the integrity of the trial. The judge found that Gordon, Hurwitz followed the
bar association's ethical requirements in spirit and to the letter. 625 F.2d at 437 (en banc);
461 F. Supp. at 623-24.
3, 625 F.2d at 443 (en banc}; 606 F.2d at 34 (panel).
606 F.2d at 33 (panel). The Armstrong panel possibly limited the application of
vicarious disqualification by creating a distinction between those cases in which disqualifica-
tion of the former government attorney resulted from that attorney's active and personal
participation in the matter and those cases in which disqualification resulted from the
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observed, will not prevent a court from disqualifying a firm when the
former government attorney had direct, personal involvement in a mat-
ter forming the basis of a private cause of action." Disagreeing with
Opinion 342, the panel found disqualification necessary as a prophylactic
measure to guard against misuse of authority by a government attorney
and to avoid any appearance of impropriety when, as in Armstrong, the
attorney actively and personally participated in the matter.17 The panel
also required the elimination of any appearance of a possible future
financial gain to a government attorney from his active personal involve-
ment in a matter. The panel feared that a government attorney might
shape a government action to enhance his employment prospects upon
leaving government service.-
The Second Circuit granted a rehearing en banc of the panel deci-
sion. 9 The full circuit vacated the panel's decision and affirmed the
district court's denial of the disqualification of Gordon, Hurwitz."0 Addi-
tionally, the court prospectively held that orders denying disqualifica-
tion motions are not appealable immediately as a matter of right.41 The
Second Circuit had requested that the parties brief the question of ap-
pealability because of the court'p concern over the practical effects of
the six year old unanimous en banc opinion in Silver Chrysler Plymouth,
nominal relationship of a supervisory official. The panel noted that the number of cases in
which a former government attorney had a direct, personal involvement in the matter
would be small when compared with the number of cases where a former government at-
torney had only a formal, supervisory role. The panel, therefore, suggested that vicarious
disqualification would not impair significantly the government's ability to recruit attorneys.
Id at 33 n.4. The SEC asserted, however, that attorneys serving for seven to eight years in
a position similar to Altman's would have substantial responsibility for "scores, if not hun-
dreds, of matters:' SEC Brief, supra note 25, at 11 n.8. The panel reserved the question of
whether screening is appropriate in cases in which the former government attorney had only
a formal, supervisory relationship to the matter and when the matter offered no realistic op-
portunity for enhancing the prospects of private employment. 606 F.2d at 33 (panel).
606 F.2d at 34 (panel). The facts in Armstrong may not support the panel's
characterization of Altman's activities as "direct, personal involvement." See note 28 supra
(discussing Altman's participation in Armstrong matter).
1 625 F.2d at 443 (en banc}; 606 F.2d at 34 (panel). Opinion 342 found the avoidance of
the appearance of impropriety a policy consideration supporting the existence of DR
9-101(B), although not the most important consideration. OPINION 342, supra note 1, at 518.
Opinion 342, however, found that effectively screening the personally disqualified attorney
from participation in the matter avoids the appearance of impropriety. IM. at 521.
606 F.2d at 34 (panel). The panel found screening ineffective to prevent financial
reward because no effective means exist to prevent an upward adjustment of a disqualified
attorney's salary or partnership share. Id The panel noted that a government lawyer would
recognize the possibility of circumventing screening procedures if that government lawyer
were tempted to misuse his authority for personal financial benefit. Further, the panel
stated that an arrangement insulating the disqualified attorney from the case would not
diminish the appearance of impropriety. Id
625 F.2d at 434 (en banc).
'0 Id. at 435.
4d-
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Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.42 In Silver Chrysler, the Second Circuit
held that appeals from the denial of disqualification motions fell within
the narrow exception to the final judgment rule which the Supreme
Court recognized in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp."
The Armstrong court noted that the availability of an immediate ap-
peal contributed substantially to the proliferation of disqualification mo-
tions and the use of disqualification motions for purely tactical reasons.""
The court also expressed concern over the practical effects on the ad-
ministration of justice resulting from the tactical use of disqualification
motions.45 In overruling Silver Chrysler, the Second Circuit found flaws
in the reasoning of that decision." The Armstrong court suggested that
the Silver Chrysler court simply found denials of disqualification mo-
tions to meet the Cohen prerequisites for immediate appeal of in-
terlocutory orders without providing any detailed analysis of the Cohen
prerequisites."
The Armstrong court found that Cohen required three prerequisites
for an exception to the final judgment rule. First, an interlocutory order
from which a party seeks immediate appeal must be collateral to the
merits. Second, the denial of an immediate appeal must result in ir-
reparable harm to the party seeking review.48 Third, the issue raised on
appeal must present serious and unsettled questions that are too impor-
tant to defer until adjudication of the entire case.49 The Armstrong court
held that denials of disqualification motions clearly were collateral to the
merits but found that denials of disqualification motions did not meet the
second and third Cohen requirements." The Armstrong court pointed
42 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974) (en banc); see 625 F.2d at 435 (en banc).
" 337 U.S. 541 (1949); see 625 F.2d at 437, 438 (en banc) (Silver Chrysler holding). The
final judgment rule prevents a party from resorting to appellate review of a trial court's rul-
ing on a motion prior to the trial court's rendering final judgment in the case. See F. JAMES
& G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 669-70 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing final judgment rule). The
narrow exception to the final judgment rule recognized by the Supreme Court in Cohen v.
Beneficial Loan Corp. arguably is the only acceptable exception to the final judgment rule.
See Note, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for Disqualification of Counsel in
the Federal Courts, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 450, 452-53 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Appealability];
text accompanying notes 48-49, 94-101 infra (discussing Cohen prerequisites for exceptions
to final judgment rule). Orders granting or denying disqualification motions are not final
decisions on the merits of a lawsuit and thus are not final judgments. See Appealability,
supra, at 452.
" 625 F.2d at 437 (en banc).
5 Id. In Armstrong, the defendants' motion to disqualify Gordon, Hurwitz delayed the
litigation from the district court's decision in June, 1978, until the Second Circuit's en banc





'9 Id. at 438-39.
Id. at 438.
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out that erroneous denials of disqualification motions do not differ
significantly from other situations where no appeal is available as a mat-
ter of right." The court noted that the second Cohen prerequisite was
not met because immediate review through certification or a writ of
mandamus, protective orders issued by the trial judge, or reconsidera-
tion of the disqualification motion prevents irreparable harm. 2 Further,
the Second Circuit reasoned that the issues raised by the denial of dis-
qualification motions are not sufficiently important to meet the third
Cohen prerequisite. The issues raised involved factual rather than legal
determinations and thus fell outside the meaning of serious and unsettled
questions.'
The Armstrong court, however, did not reach the same conclusion
with respect to orders granting disqualification motions. The Armstrong
court found orders granting disqualification appealable immediately as a
matter of right." The court observed that allowing the immediate appeal
of a grant of disqualification disrupts litigation no more than the disrup-
tion caused by the grant of disqualification. 5 A disqualification effectively
requires postponement of litigation for the disqualified counsel's client
to retain new counsel and for the party's new counsel to prepare."8
Permanent damage to the disqualified law firm's reputation might result
if the law firm cannot appeal its disqualification immediately. The court
also observed that an immediate appeal from a grant of disqualification
has limited tactical use. The grant of a disqualification motion is a fair in-
dication that the motion raised nonfrivolous issues.' Further, the court
5 Id. Immediate appeal is not available from orders requiring discovery over a work
product objection or orders denying motions for recusal of the trial judge. Id.
Id. at 438-39; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) (allowing interlocutory appeal through
certification). Section 1292(b) provides that when a district judge believes that an order, not
otherwise appealable, involves a controlling question of law on which a substantial ground
for difference of opinion exists and that an appeal may advance materially the termination
of the litigation, the judge shall so state in the order. The court of appeals then has the
discretion to grant an immediate appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). The Armstrong court ad-
mitted that a party may have to bear the time and expense of a possible tainted trial if the
trial court denies the party's disqualification motion and the appellate court also denies an
immediate appeal. 625 F.2d at 438 (en banc).
1 625 F.2d at 439 (en bane). The factual questions normally raised by a disqualification
motion include whether threat of taint to the underlying trial exists, whether the screening
is adequate, and whether a substantial relationship exists between the prior and present
representations. Id The Armstrong court found immediate appeal through certification or
by mandamus adequate in those cases that raise important and unresolved legal questions.
Id.; see note 52 supra (appeal through certification or by mandamus).
11 625 F.2d at 440-41 (en bane).
'3Id. at 441.
'Id.
',Id. The injury to a firm's reputation resulting from disqualification may never be
corrected on appeal if the firm's former client is satisfied with the performance of his new
counsel. Id
"Id.
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noted that disqualification effectively might terminate the litigation if
the court denies an immediate appeal. 9
After determining the advisability of reaching the merits of the ap-
peal,"0 the Armstrong court considered the standard applicable to dis-
qualification motions. The court noted that the appropriateness of in-
cluding screening procedures as a part of this standard is currently a
hotly contested issue."1 The court stated, however, that entry into this
debate was neither necessary nor appropriate.2 The court nevertheless
observed that rejecting the efficacy of screening procedures might
hamper the government's efforts to hire qualified attorneys. 3
The Armstrong court found the Second Circuit's approach to ethical
questions in Board of Education v. Nyquist" dispositive of the standard
applicable to disqualification motions.6 5 The Nyguist court adopted a
restrained approach to disqualification, emphasizing preservation of the
integrity of the trial process.6 In Nyquist, the court stated that, except
in rare instances, the Second Circuit has ordered disqualification of
counsel only under two situations." The first situation occurs when an
attorney's conflict of interest undermines the court's confidence in the
attorney's representation. 8 The more common situation occurs when the
attorney potentially can use privileged information concerning his oppo-
nent. 9 Consequently, the Nyquist court held that unless the attorney's
conduct tends to "taint the underlying trial," the appearance of impro-
priety should not warrant a disqualification order."0 The Armstrong
SId. The grant of a disqualification motion effectively would terminate litigation if the
disqualified counsel's client cannot afford to begin litigation anew. Id.
' The Armstrong court found that a refusal to reach the merits would leave the
Second Circuit's law on attorney disqualification muddled. Id at 441. Failure to clarify the
law of the circuit would leave the courts with diminished opportunities to obtain clarifica-
tion in the future. Id. at 441-42. The Armstrong court also found that dismissal of the appeal
without reaching the merits would waste judicial effort. Id. at 442.
Id. at 444.
Id. The Armstrong court failed to state why its entry into the debate over the ap-
propriateness of screening as a standard was neither necessary nor appropriate. Id.
Id. at 443.
590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979).
625 F.2d at 444-45 (en banc).
See id. at 444 (discussing Nyquist).
'7 590 F.2d at 1246.
" Id. The Nyquist court was concerned with conflicts of interests which violate
Canons 5 and 9 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. Id. Canon 5 states that "A
Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client." ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 5 (1979).
590 F.2d at 1246.
70 Id at 1246-47; accord, W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677-78 (2d Cir. 1976);
see Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976) (reasonable possibil-
ity must exist that some specifically identifiable impropriety occurred). Several courts have
adopted or cited the Nyquist position approvingly. See, e.g., United States v. Birdman, 602
F.2d 547, 559, 560 & n.56 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980); Kerry Coal Co. v.
District 5 UMW, 470 F. Supp. 1032, 1035-37 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Society for Good Will to
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court additionally suggested that absent taint of the trial process, the
legislature or the disciplinary machinery of the bar can address better
the ethical issues raised during litigation.7'
The Armstrong court found that disqualification was unnecessary
under the Nyquist standard." The Second Circuit noted that neither the
trial judge nor the panel saw a threat of taint to the trial by Gordon,
Hurwitz' continued representation of the receiver." The Armstrong
court found no reason to fear a lack of vigor by Gordon, Hurwitz7' or that
the firm would be in position to use privileged information which Altman
obtained while a government official.7" The SEC gave its files on the mat-
ter to the receiver long before Armstrong retained Gordon, Hurwitz."
The court also found no reason to believe that Armstrong retained Gor-
don, Hurwitz because of Altman. The court indicated that Gordon, Hur-
witz, the receiver, and the district court considered Altman's association
with Gordon, Hurwitz to be a hindrance to the receiver's retention of the
firm."'
The Second Circuit's explicit overruling of Silver Chrysler"8 con-
tinued the trend away from the immediate appealability of denials of dis-
qualification motions." The circuits now are split evenly on the question
of whether to allow immediate appeals." The three circuits that most re-
Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 722, 724-25 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
The Nyquist court reasoned that disqualification has an immediate adverse impact on
the client by separating him from counsel of his choice. Additionally, a party often inter-
poses disqualification motions for tactical reasons. Unless a taint exists in the trial, the Ny-
quist court concluded that the needs of efficient judicial administration outweigh the poten-
tial advantages of immediate preventive measures. 590 F.2d at 1246.
"' 625 F.2d at 446 (en banc).
12 Id. at 445-46.
Id. at 445; see 606 F.2d at 34 (panel) (finding no threat of taint of underlying trail);
461 F. Supp. at 625 (trial judge finding no threat of taint to underlying trial).
"' 625 F.2d at 445 (en banc). The court noted that Gordon, Hurwitz was not using a
Chinese Wall to justify simultaneous representation of conflicting interests. Cf. Fund of
Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 229-32 (2d Cir. 1977) (Chinese Wall in-
effective to prevent disqualification when single law firm represents two adverse clients);
Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1385-87 (2d Cir. 1976) (law firm disqualified
because partner in firm also partner in firm representing adverse party).
625 F.2d at 445 (en banc).
Id.; see note 109 infra.
625 F.2d at 445 (en bane); see text accompanying notes 113-16 infra (why Gordon,
Hurwitz chosen as counsel).
" The Armstrong court overruled Silver Chrysler and held that orders denying dis-
qualification motions are not appealable immediately. 625 F.2d at 440 (en banc).
"' See T. Lewin, The Rising Tide of Conflicts, NAT'L L.J. May 26, 1980, at 1, col. 1
[hereinafter cited as Rising Tide] (quoting statement by L. Ray Paterson, Dean, Emory Law
School, that Armstrong continues trend away from appealability of disqualification
motions).
" Five circuits now allow interlocutory appeals of denials of disqualification motions.
See Westinghouse Elec. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1322 (7th Cir.), cedrt. denied,
439 U.S. 955 (1978); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1200 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); Brown & Williams v. Daniel Int'l. Corp., 563 F.2d 671,
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cently have considered the question have denied immediate appeals. 1
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review the decision of the
Eighth Circuit in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord" and may con-
sider the apealability of the denial of disqualification motions."3
By overruling Silver Chrysler, the Second Circuit also continued the
development of a pattern of periodic reconsideration and reversal of the
question whether denials of disqualification motions are appealable im-
mediately. The Second Circuit first considered the appealability of
denials of disqualification in 1956.84 In Harmar Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. ,85 the court found denials of disqualification
to fall within the Cohen exception to the final judgement rule." Three
years later, the Second Circuit reversed Harmar in Fleischer v.
Phillips."7 Silver Chrysler overruled Fleischer in 1974.8 This pattern of
672-73 (5th Cir. 1977); Akerly v. Red Barn Systems, Inc., 551 F.2d 539, 542-43 (3d Cir. 1977);
New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1106 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121
(1978). Five circuits do not allow interlocutory appeals of denials of disqualification motions.
See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 435, 441 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc); In re Multi-Piece
Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 612 F.2d 377, 378 (8th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 100 S. Ct. 2150 (1980); Melamen v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592
F.2d 290, 295-96 (6th Cir. 1979); Community Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022,
1026-27 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Chucagh Elec. Ass'n v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of
Alaska, 370 F.2d 441, 444 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1967). The First Circuit
has not considered the question. In Grinnele Corp. v. Hackett, 519 F.2d 595 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975), the First Circuit appeared to express its disapproval of Silver
Chrysler. The Grinnele court stated that Silver Chrysler reflected an over concern for
judicial economy. Id. at 587 n.4.
81 See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 433; In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab.
Litig., 612 F.2d 377, 378 (8th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Risjord, 100 S. Ct. 2150 (1980); Melamen v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290, 295-96
(6th Cir. 1979).
' 100 S. Ct. 2150, granting cert. sub num., In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig.,
612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980).
" See Rising Tide, supra note 79, at 1, col. 1 (discussing Multi-Piece Prods.). Only two
issues are before the Supreme Court in Firestone Tire. The first issue is whether a denial of
disqualification is a final decision in a collateral matter so as to qualify for an appeal pur-
suant to the Cohen exception to the final judgment rule. The other issue is whether the
court below erred in allowing a potential reoccurring conflict by sanctioning simultaneous
representation of both plaintiffs over the defendant's objections. See 48 U.S.L.W. 3701
(April 29, 1980) (issues before the Court in Firestone Tire).
' Prior to 1956 the Second Circuit allowed immediate appeals of grants of disqualifica-
tion. See Fisher Studio, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 232 F.2d 199, 204 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
836 (1956) (denial of disqualification separate and collateral to merits); Lansky Bros. of W.
Va., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932
(1956) (failing to address appealability question); Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Cir.
Mgt. Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954) (failing to address appealability question).
8 239 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 824 (1956).
Id. at 556. The Harmar court stated that no distinction exists between orders grant-
ing and orders refusing disqualification. Id.
264 F.2d 515, 517 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959).
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800, 806 (2d Cir.
1974) (en banc).
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reconsideration and reversal was not a result of a rapid and dramatic
change in the Second Circuit's application of Cohen to denials of dis-
qualification. 9 The pattern of reconsideration and reversal occurred
because of the Second Circuit's overriding concern for the practical ef-
fect of its decisions on the progress of litigation."' The Second Circuit ap-
parently used its interpretation of Cohen as a method of judicial regula-
tion of the flow of litigation.9 This practical approach to Cohen follows
the Cohen mandate that the Cohen prerequisites receive a practical
rather than a theoretical construction.92 Therefore, the Armstrong court
" In Harmar (1956) and Silver Chrysler (1974), the Second Circuit held that denials of
disqualification were 'appealable immediately. See text accompanying notes 86 & 88 supra.
The Silver Chrysler court stated that it was returning to the wisdom of Harmar. 496 F.2d
at 805.
In Fleischer (1959) and Armstrong (1980), the Second Circuit held that denials of dis-
qualification were not appealable immediately. See text accompanying notes 41 & 87 supra.
Similarities exist in the analyses used in the Fleischer and Armstrong opinions. The Arm-
strong court found that the harm caused by an erroneous denial of a disqualification motion
did not differ significantly from the harm caused by the denial of a motion for recusal of the
trial judge or of a motion for discovery over a workproduct objection. 625 F.2d at 438 (en
banc). The Fleischer court found that the denial of disqualification causes no harm to the
party requesting disqualification and that party's status compares to the status of a party
calling a possible instance of misconduct to the attention of the court. 264 F.2d at 516. The
Armstrong court stated that appeals from denials of disqualification result in delays. 625
F.2d at 437 (en banc). The Fleischer court stated that the availability of immediate appeals
led to wasteful litigation. 264 F.2d at 517. Both courts also noted that orders granting dis-
qualification seriously disrupt litigation and sully the reputation of the disqualified at-
torney. 625 F.2d at 441 (en banc); 264 F.2d at 517.
9 The Fleischer court noted that Harmar led to wasteful appeals resulting in lengthy
delays in the progress of litigaion. 264 F.2d at 517. The Silver Chrysler court indicated that
overruling Fleiseher would prevent waste of judicial and attorney time. 496 F.2d at 806.
The Armstrong court noted that the use of appeals from denials of disqualification to delay
litigation raises grave questions of judicial administration sufficient to justify reconsidera-
tion of Silver Chrysler. 625 F.2d at 437-38 (en banc).
The Fleischer and Armstrong courts properly found that immediate appeals of denials
of disqualification motions result in delays in the progress of litigation. See note 45 supra
(delay in Armstrong litigation caused by immediate appeal of denial of disqualification). The
availabilty of immediate appeal of denials of disqualification also contributes substantially
to the use of disqualification motions for purely tactical reasons. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625
F.2d at 433, 437 (en banc); see Appealability, supra note 43, at 450-51 (tactical use of dis-
qualification motions); Rising Tide, supra note 79, at 1, col. 3 (commentators hope Supreme
Court will limit tactical use of disqualification motions); note 20 supra (use of disqualification
motion for tactical purposes).
91 In Fleischer, the Second Circuit indicated that litigation would not advance
materially if courts allow immediate appeals of denials of disqualification. 264 F.2d at 517. In
Silver Chrysler, the Second Circuit allowed immediate appeals of denials of disqualification
to prevent waste of judicial time. 496 F.2d at 806. In Armstrong, the Second Circuit recon-
sidered Silver Chrysler because of the grave questions of judicial administration raised by
the use of immediate appeals of denials of disqualification to delay litigation. 625 F.2d at
437-38 (en bane).
" The Cohen Court stated that the final judgement statutes have long been given a
practical rather than a technical construction. Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
546 (1949). A truly "practical" construction of the finality statutes requires that the courts
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should have admitted that it based its decision on the practical applica-
tion of Cohen rather than on the flawed "conceptual basis" of Silver
Chrysler.3
Ironically, the basis of the Armstrong court's reasoning was flawed.
The court misstated the Cohen prerequisites for exceptions to the final
judgement rule." The Supreme Court recently articulated these stand-
ards in Abney v. United States." Under Abney, the district court's order
first must dispose fully of the issue to be appealed. Second, the issue
decided must be completely collateral to the cause of action asserted.
Third, the decision must involve an important right that would be lost,
probably irreparably, if an immediate appeal were not possible. The
Cohen Court indicated, however, that a fourth prerequisite also exists
for exceptions to the final judgment rule. The fourth prerequisite is that
the issue raised on appeal present serious and unsettled questions too
important to deny an immediate appeal. 7 The Armstrong court stated
this possible fourth Cohen requirement as the third Cohen
requirement. 8 If the serious and unsettled questions requirement was a
fourth Cohen prerequisite, this fourth reprequisite apparently did not
survive Abney.9 Additionally, the Armstrong court ignored the first
Cohen requirement articulated in Abney and misnumbered the Abney
Court's statement of the second Cohen requirement as the first Cohen
requirment. 1 ° The Armstrong court's statement of the second Cohen re-
quirement was a close, but not completely accurate, statement of the
Abney Court's articulation of the third Cohen requirement. Thus, the
Armstrong court should have stated that the third Cohen prerequisite
requires that the trial court's decision involve an important right that
treat an order as final only if the order effectively disposes of litigation. Orders denying dis-
qualification, therefore, are not final because such orders do not terminate the litigation,
either practically or theoretically. See Appealability, supra note 43, at 454 n.17 (practical
application of Cohen to disqualification motions).
"3 See 625 F.2d at 438 (en banc) (Armstrong court overruled Silver Chrysler because
"conceptual basis" of Silver Chrysler flawed).
" See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra (Armstrong court's statement of Cohen re-
quirements).
's 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977).
"Id.
See 337 U.S. at 546-47 (trial court's order denying security bond was too important
to be denied an immediate appeal and presented serious and unsettled questions); Appeal-
ability, supra note 43, at 455 (discussing fourth Cohen requirement)
" See 625 F.2d at 438 (en banc) (stating Cohen requirements); text accompanying note
49 supra (Armstrong court's statement of third Cohen requirement).
" See 431 U.S. at 658 (no mention of fourth Cohen requirement). But see Appealabil-
ity, supra note 43, at 455-56, 461-64 (suggesting that fourth Cohen prerequisite still re-
quired). The two most recent Supreme Court cases to cite Cohen relied on Abney's state-
ment of the Cohen prerequisites for exceptions to the final judgment rule. Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 436, 468 (1978); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 855
(1978).
" See text accompanying notes 48 & 96 supra (stating Cohen prerequisites for excep-
tions to final judgment rule).
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would be lost, probably irreparably, if an immediate appeal were not
possible."'
Despite the Armstrong court's misstatement of the Cohen prere-
quisites, the Armstrong court properly found that denials of disqualifica-
tion motions are not appealable under Cohen. The Second Circuit cor-
rectly stated that any harm resulting from the denial of disqualification
is not irreparable. Certification or a writ of mandamus provides a means
for immediate review in cases in which an important right would be
lost.' 2 Further, the appellate court can grant a new trial if, on appeal
from final judgment, the appellate court determines that the trial court
incorrectly denied disqualification.' The denial of a disqualification mo-
tion arguably does not dispose fully of the question presented by a dis-
qualification motion. The trial court can hear new evidence and grant
disqualification later in the litigation."4
The Armstrong court also correctly found orders granting disqualifi-
cation motions to be appealable as a matter of right. Orders denying dis-
qualification do not present the practical problems that orders granting
disqualifications present.' Further, irreparable harm to a law firm's
reputation might result if the law firm may not appeal the firm's dis-
qualification immediately. Review of the grant of disqualification would
occur only if the firm's former client appealed the final judgment on the
merits. Therefore, harm to the firm's reputation resulting from an er-
roneous grant of disqualification would remain uncorrected if the law
firm's former client chose not to appeal.' 0
In addition to correctly finding that denials of disqualification mo-
tions are not appealable as a matter of right, the Armstrong court prop-
erly determined that the disqualification of Gordon, Hurwitz was un-
necessary. The Armstrong court's acceptance of the Nyquist standard
was sound. Emphasizing the avoidance of taint to the underlying trial
prevents a court from basing the grant or denial of disqualification on
form over substance. A court should not disqualify a law firm merely to
avoid a possible appearance of impropriety if no threat of a conflict of in-
terest actually exists. The Armstrong court's application of the Nyquist
101Id
10 See note 52 supra (discussing immediate review through certification).
' 625 F.2d at 438 (en banc).
l The Supreme Court in Abney addressed the question of whether a pretrial order de-
nying a motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds is appealable im-
mediately under Cohen. 431 U.S. at 653. In analyzing the first Cohen requirement, that the
decision fully disposed of the question, the Abney Court stated that no further steps were
available to the defendant to prevent the trial that the defendant claimed double jeopardy
barred. Id at 659. A court, however, can revise an order denying disqualification. A party
can move anew for disqualification if the disqualified attorney's law firm does not effectively
screen the attorney after the original motion to disqualify. See 625 F.2d at 438-39 (en banc).
,05 See text accompanying notes 55-56, 59 supra (discussing disruption in litigation
resulting from grant of disqualification motion).
l0, 625 F.2d at 441 (en banc); see note 57 supra (damage to disqualified firm's reputation
may never be corrected if former client fails to appeal).
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standard to the facts of Armstrong also was sound. Neither the trial
judge nor the panel found a threat of taint if the firm continued to repre-
sent Armstrong."'7 Altman also was not in a position to convey privileged
information obtained while a government official." 8 The SEC opened its
files on the matter to the receiver prior to the receiver's retaining Gor-
don, Hurwitz. Therefore, the firm had access to the SEC files through
the receiver."9 Further, Armstrong and Gordon, Hurwitz received court
approval for screening Altman when Judge Stewart authorized the firm
as litigation counsel."' The Armstrong court stated that Gordon, Hur-
witz followed these court approved screening procedures."'
Altman's presence in the Armstrong controversy also did not fulfill
the panel's fear that a government attorney would shape a government
action to enhance his future employment prospects."' Armstrong did not
retain Gordon, Hurwitz because of Altman's association with the firm."'
Armstrong approached Gordon, Hurwitz only after abortive negotia-
tions with two other firms."' Armstrong chose Gordon, Hurwitz because
a partner of the firm was involved in legal action in Costa Rica, while
another partner had specialized experience in prosecuting complex
fraud cases." In addition, the firm was willing to delay payment for its
services."
1 625 F.2d at 455 (en bane); see 606 F.2d at 34 (panel) (finding no threat of taint to
underlying trial); 461 F. Supp. at 615 (trial judge's finding of no threat of taint to underlying
trial.
108 625 F.2d at 445 (en banc).
" The SEC opened its files in the Armstrong controversy to the receiver in accord
with the SEC's long-standing practice of assisting the efforts of court appointed receivers in
SEC law enforcement actions. SEC Brief, supra note 25, at 7. J. Robert Lunney, counsel for
the Armstrong defendants, claims that Gordon, Hurwitz is using confidential information
that Altman gathered during the course of his employment at the SEC and that the SEC
and Gordon, Hurwitz specifically refused to give this information to the defendants.
Telephone interview with J. Robert Lunney, Lunney & Crocco (August 19, 1980); accord,
Reply Brief for Appellant on rehearing en banc at 13, Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433
(2d Cir. 1980). Once litigation between the receiver and a third party ensues, however, the
SEC provides both sides equal access to the SEC's files on the matter through discovery.
SEC Brief, supra note 25, at 7. Since the Armstrong court did not address this charge by
Mr. Lunney and found that Gordon, Hurwitz effectively screened Altman, the Armstrong
court must have determined that Mr. Lunney's charge was unfounded.
II 625 F.2d at 436 (en bane); see note 32 supra (court approval of screening of Altman).
' 625 F.2d at 437, 442-43, 445 (en bane); see note 31 supra (discussing trial court's find-
ing that Gordon, Hurwitz followed court approved screening procedures).
" See 606 F.2d at 33 (panel) (Armstrong panel's fear that government attorney would
shape government action to enhance his future employment prospects).
I 625 F.2d at 445 (en bane).
1 Id. at 436. Armstrong originally retained Barrett, Smith, Shapiro & Simon as
counsel. Two years later, Barrett, Smith became aware of a potential conflict of interest in-
volving one of the firm's institutional clients. The receiver concluded that the receiver
should substitute litigation counsel. Id. at 435.
"I Id. at 436. The receiver's action against McAlpin and Capital involved complex
allegations of security fraud violations. The action also required litigation in Costa Rica
because McAlpin fled to Costa Rica with most of Capital's assets. Id. at 435-36
I Id. at 436. Only limited funds were available to the receiver to retain new counsel.
Thus, substitute counsel would receive little or no interim compensation. Id. at 435-36.
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In Armstrong, the Second Circuit had an opportunity to resolve the
controversial question of whether screening can prevent vicarious dis-
qualification of a former government attorney's law firm. The court
chose not to address this issue directly and explicitly deferred the deci-
sion to the state and federal bar associations. " 7 By deferring the ques-
tion of screening, the Armstrong court arguably abdicated the court's
judicial duty to regulate the conduct of attorneys practicing before it." 8
The court, however, neither abdicated its judical duty nor completely
deferred the question of screening to the bar. By adopting the Nyquist
standard of prevention of taint to the underlying trial, the Armstrong
court implicitly accepted the efficacy of screening."' The screening pro-
cedures of Opinion 342 clearly appear to prevent taint to the underlying
trial when effectively enforced. 2 ° Further, the Second Circuit suggested
that the bar must enforce any standard stricter than required by Ny-
quist through its disciplinary machinery. 2 ' Thus, the bar must decide
whether to adopt a stricter standard. Unless the bar adopts a stricter
standard, the Armstrong decision provides the courts and former
government attorneys with a standard that considers disqualification ap-
propriate only when taint to the underlying trial results from ineffective
enforcement of the screening procedures of Opinion 342.
Prior to the Armstrong en banc decision, but subsequent to the
panel decision, the ABA's Commission of Evaluation of Professional
Standards (Kutak Commission) addressed the issue of whether to base
disqualification of a law firm on actual impropriety or on an appearance
of impropriety. On February 20, 1980, the Kutak Commission published
the Discussion Draft of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Discussion Draft). 2 The Kutak Commission apparently found that the
ideal of absolute disqualification outweighed the need to limit vicarious
117 Id. at 444, 446.
"s The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should take appropriate
disciplinary measures against a lawyer for unprofessional conduct. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, Canon No. (B)(3) (1972); see Ethical Problems, supra note 8, at 529 n.68 (judge has
obligation to regulate conduct of attorneys practicing before him).
" The Armstrong court stated that resolution of the ethical propriety of the screening
procedure was unnecessary as long as the trial court justifiably regarded screening as an ef-
fective means of isolating Altman from litigation. 625 F.2d at 445 (en bane}.
" The Armstrong court found that underlying trial untainted because the screening
procedures of Opinion 342 effectively isolated Altman from the litigation. Id. at 442-43, 445.
1I The Armstrong court stated that if no taint to the underlying trial exists, the
disciplinary machinery of the bar is a better vehicle to address possible ethical conflicts aris-
ing during litigation. Id- at 446.
In DISCUSSION DRAFT OF ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1980),
reprinted in 540 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1-31 (Feb. 20, 1980) [hereinafter cited as DISCUS-
SION DRAFT and cited to 540 SEC. REG. & L. REP.]. The Kutak Commission will revise the
Discussion Draft based on written submissions and public commentary. After making these
revisions, the Kutak Commission will submit the final proposed rules to the ABA House of
Delegates for consideration in February, 1981. See Kutak, Coming: The New Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A.J. 46, 49 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Kutak] (introducing
Discussion Draft).
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disqualificiation. Section 1.1(e) of the Discussion Draft imposes man-
datory vicarious disqualification on the law firm of a former government
attorney when that attorney participated personally and substantially in
the matter in controversy while a public employee." The Discussion
Draft does not allow the waiver of vicarious disqualification permitted
by Opinion 342.124
The Discussion Draft appears to incorporate the Armstrong panel's
concept that a court should consider the nature of a former government
attorney's participation in a matter when ruling on a disqualification mo-
tion.125 Section 1.11(a) requires disqualification of the former government
attorney only when the attorney participated personally and substantially
in the matter while a government employee. 2 ' The Armstrong panel
created a distinction between those cases in which a former government
attorney's disqualification results from the attorney's active, personal
participation in a matter and those cases in which disqualification results
from the attorney's nominal involvement as a supervisory official."M The
Discussion Draft, however, does not incorporate this distinction suc-
cessfully. Section 1.11(f) allows the appropriate government agency to
waive personal disqualification of the former government attorney."
Therefore, the waiver of section 1.11(a) disqualification allowed by sec-
tion 1.11(f) gives the government agency the power to waive disqualifica-
tion of a former employee who participated personally and substantially
in the matter in controversy while employed by that agency. The ABA
should eliminate the waiver of section 1.11(a) disqualification allowed by
'" Under § 1.11(a) of the Discussion Draft, a former government attorney cannot accept
employment in a matter in which he participated personally and substantially as a public
employee. Section 1.11(e) prohibits a partner or associate of a lawyer who must decline
employment under § 1.11(a) from accepting such employment. DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note
122, at 9. The Draft does not specifically prohibit the screening procedure approved in Opin-
ion 342 since the draft cites Opinion 342 in the comments. See id. at 10. The authors of the
Discussion Draft, however, intended mandatory vicarious disqualification. See Kutak, supra
note 122, at 49 (Discussion Draft requires mandatory vicarious disqualification); Patterson,
An analysis of the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 31 MERCER L. REv. 645,
658 (1980) (Discussion Draft requires mandatory vicarious disqualification); Memorandum of
Thomas D. Morgan and Ronald D. Rotunda to Users of PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (July 1980) at 10 (interpreting Discussion Draft to require manda-
tory vicarious disqualification).
12 While § 1.11(f) of the Discussion Draft explicitly allows waiver of personal dis-
qualification of the former government attorney, the section does not mention waiver of §
1.11(e)'s provision for vicarious disqualification. DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 122, at 9.
Therefore, the exclusion of vicarious disqualification from the waiver section indicates the
authors' intention that vicarious disqualification may not be waived. Cf. note 123 supra
(Discussion Draft authors intended absolute vicarious disqualification).
1" A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DRAFT WOULD IMPOSE NEW
BURDENS ON CORPORATE COUNSEL, 541 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-3 at A-4, A-5 (Feb. 20,
1980).
11 DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 122, at 9; see note 123 supra.
11 See text accompanying note 35 supra (distinction created by Armstrong panel).
11 DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 122, at 9. See also note 124 supra.
1981] FUTURE OF THE CHINESE WALL DEFENSE 169
section 1.11(f) if the ABA accepts the Discussion tbraft. If the ABA per-
mits waiver of section 1.11(a) disqualification, a government agency
could misuse this power by allowing a former employee to pursue a
government objective in private practice free from the restrictions im-
posed on government personnel." Further, the former government at-
torney would benefit from his knowledge of confidential information
received while a public employee.
In an attempt to offer an alternative to the Discussion Draft, the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America requested that the Roscoe
Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation establish the Commission on
Professional Responsibility. 30 The Commission on Professional Respon-
sibility recently published a public discussion draft of the American
Lawyer's Code of Conduct (Lawyer's Code of Conduct)."' Section 9.15 of
the Lawyer's Code of Conduct explicitly requires vicarious disqualifica-
tion of a former government attorney's law firm when that attorney par-
ticipated personally and substantially in a related matter while in public
service."' The comments to section 9.15 clearly indicate that the
Lawyer's Code of Conduct does not approve screening."' Also, section
9.15 does not allow any waiver of disqualification."
The current reconsideration of vicarious disqualification by the
American Association of Trial Lawyers, the ABA, and the Second Cir-
cuit is particularly timely. The size of law firms and the number of
government attorneys have increased dramatically over the past ten
years. These changes have resulted in an increase in the number of cases
in which a former government attorney faces a possible conflict of in-
terest."' As a result of this increase, motions for vicarious disqualifica-
tion of a former government attorney's law firm soon may become stand-
ard. Further, if courts regularly grant vicarious disqualification, the
revolving door between private practice and government service would
stop. Former government attorneys would become "Typhoid Marys""'
shunned by prospective employers. Employment of former government
attorneys might result in an entire firm's disqualification in a wide range
of cases."17 Additionally, the government no longer could attract bright
'" The Armstrong panel expressed fear that a former government attorney might pur-
sue the goverment's objective in an action through private litigation. 606 F.2d at 33 (panel).
" Commission on Professional Responsibility, The Roscoe Pound-American Trial
Lawyers Foundation, The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct, 16 TRIAL 44, 45 (August
1980).
"I Id. at 48-63. (reprinting public discussion draft of proposed American Lawyer's Code
of Conduct).
"' Id. at 60.
"' See id. at 62-63 (comments to § 9.15).
IU See id. at 60, 62-63 (§ 9.15 and comments to § 9.15).
' See Landua, Practical Aspects of Dealing With Conflicts of Interest in the Cor-
porate Practice of Law Firms, 10 INST. OF SEC. REG. 405, 407-08 (1979) (discussing increasing
number of conflict of interest motions).
13 Kesselhault v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam).
13 See 625 F.2d at 443 (en banc); Kesselhault v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl.
1977); Insulation or Disqualification, supra note 8, at 410 n.36.
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young lawyers or experienced and qualified attorneys to fill policymak-
ing positions."
An end to the debate over vicarious disqualification of the law firm
of a former government attorney may be closer as a result of the Second
Circuit's decision in Armstrong v. McAlpin. The Second Circuit's adop-
tion of the Nyquist standard of prevention of taint to the underlying
trial will discourage a routine disqualification motion in every case in
which an appearance of impropriety exists."9 Further, the court's accept-
ance of a standard based on avoiding the taint to the underlying trial"'
may force acceptance of screening."' The ABA should reject the Kutak
Commission's Discussion Draft, and the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America should reject the Commission on Professional Responsibility's
Lawyer's Code of Conduct in light of the Second Circuit's holding in
Armstrong. Both bodies also should reject the proposed ethical codes
because the government's inability to attract the best personnel
available is too high a price to pay for absolute vicarious disqualification.
Rejection of absolute vicarious disqualification also would eliminate the
invalid presumption that misconduct will occur unless an absolute rule
exists to preclude any possibility of unethical conduct.' Further, if
courts base disqualification on an appearance of impropriety when no
threat of taint to the underlying trial exists, greater damage to the
public's confidence in the legal profession will occur than if courts allow
the appearance of impropriety. 4 Public confidence also will diminish if
the public experiences increased difficulty in retaining counsel of its
choice as a result of an increase in the number of firm disqualifications.'
'38 See HAZARD, supra note 8, at 111-13 (effects of absolute vicarious disqualification on
government's ability to attract attorneys); New Rule, supra note 8, at 725-26 (noting effect
of absolute vicarious disqualification on named government employees).
"' A party would hesitate to bear the financial burden of a disqualification motion
knowing that the court would deny the motion because no threat of taint to the underlying
trial exists. See text accompanying note 70 (Nyquist requires disqualification only if at-
torney's conduct tends to taint underlying trial).
140 See text accompanying notes 64-70 supra (discussing adoption of Nyquist standard).
.. See text accompanying notes 119-21 supra (question before bar after Armstrong).
' See Wiley, Speaking Out Against Ethics Committee Inquiry 19, DIST. LAW., Winter
1976, 35 (criticizing absolute vicarious disqualification because of its presumption that im-
propriety would occur unless any possibility of impropriety is barred absolutely).
"' Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 589
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975); see 625 F.2d at 446 (en banc) (restrained
approach to vicarious disqualification reinforces public confidence in fairness and efficiency
of judicial process).
... The bar fulfills its obligation to meet the public's need for legal counsel only if
acceptable counsel is available. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-1 (1979).
If the bar is unable to fulfill its obligation to provide the public with acceptable counsel, the
public's confidence in the legal profession will diminish. See OPINION 342, supra note 1, at
521 (inflexible vicarious disqualification would inhibit opportunity for all litigants to obtain
competent counsel of own choosing); N.Y. Opinion 889, supra note 20, at 566 (approving
screening because of bar's obligation to provide skilled legal counsel); Business as Usual,
supra note 1, at 1562 (public suspicion of bar and judiciary increases as frequency of un-
necessary disqualifications increases).
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The ABA, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, and the
courts should adopt standards for ethical conduct for former govern-
ment attorneys that specifically approve screening."' The standards
should require court approval of the screening procedures at the outset
of litigation."8 The standards also should require both the disqualified at-
torney and his law firm to file affidavits at the outset of litigation at-
testing to their intention to follow court approved screening procedures
and at the conclusion of litigation attesting to adherence to the screen-
ing procedures."7 Finally, an appropriate standard should allow a party,
upon showing a breach of the screening procedures, to move to dis-
qualify the personally disqualified attorney's law firm at any time during
the litigation."'
JAMES B. McLAREN, JR.*
. Although the Armstrong court's implicit acceptance of screening was sound, explicit
acceptance of screening would have defined more clearly the law of the Second Circuit.
.. Judicial approval of screening avoids requiring consent of the government agency
that formerly employed the disqualifed attorney. The government attorney consenting for
the agency might favor screening because of his or the agency's own self-interest or because
he personally knows the attorney in question. See N.Y. Opinion 889, supra note 20, at
566-67; Ethical Problems, supra note 8, at 520-21, 528-29; Note, Conflicts of Interest and the
Former Government Attorney, 65 GEo. L.J. 1025, 1051 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Conflicts
of Interest]. Judicial approval of screening falls within the court's duty to regulate the con-
duct of the members of the bar practicing before the court. See note 118 supra (court's
obligation to regulate conduct of attorneys practicing before it). Some commentators recom-
mend approval of screening by an impartial committee or board. See New Rule, supra note
8, at 726, 727-28 (independent approval of screening); Conflicts of Interest, supra (committee
or board comprised of general public and disinterested members of bar).
.. Requiring affidavits would ensure that screening is effective. An attorney would be
more cautious in his adherence to screening measures knowing that he must attest to
adherence under oath. The D.C. Bar Association proposed a requirement of affidavits in its
Final Revolving Door Proposal submitted to the D.C. Court of Appeals. The Final Revolving
Door Proposal specifically approved screening. Final Revolving Door Proposal Submitted
to D.C. Court of Appeals, DIST. LAW., Ap.-May, 1979, at 62-63.
"' Specifically allowing parties to move for disqualification at any point during litiga-
tion should ensure the effectiveness of court approved screening. Few law firms would risk
malpractice suits by their clients by circumventing the screening of an attorney in order to
obtain an advantage for that client.
*The writer wishes to thank note and comment editor Thomas McN. Millhiser for providing
his unpublished note on the panel decision in Armstrong v. McAlpin.
